研讨论文

Information Design: A Unified Perspective (Journal of Economic Literature. Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris. 2019)

主讲人

姜渭（北京大学2021级博士生）

论文简介

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information.

点评老师

张志祥、尹训东、史博文

时间

4月1日18:00-20:00

线下地址

学术会堂712

活动对象

一竞技学生

活动规模

30人

主办

一竞技